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Abstract
The Quantum Decision Theory, developed recently by the authors, is applied to clarify
the role of risk and uncertainty in decision making and in particular in relation to the phe-
nomenon of dynamic inconsistency. By formulating this notion in precise mathematical
terms, we distinguish three types of inconsistency: time inconsistency, planning para-
dox, and inconsistency occurring in some discounting effects. While time inconsistency
is well accounted for in classical decision theory, the planning paradox is in contradiction
with classical utility theory. It finds a natural explanation in the frame of the Quan-
tum Decision Theory. Different types of discounting effects are analyzed and shown to
enjoy a straightforward explanation within the suggested theory. We also introduce a gen-
eral methodology based on self-similar approximation theory for deriving the evolution
equations for the probabilities of future prospects. This provides a novel classification
of possible discount factors, which include the previously known cases (exponential or
hyperbolic discounting), but also predicts a novel class of discount factors that decay to a
strictly positive constant for very large future time horizons. This class may be useful to
deal with very long-term discounting situations associated with intergenerational public
policy choices, encompassing issues such as global warming and nuclear waste disposal.
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1 Introduction
The concept of risk is widely used in economics, finance, psychology, as well as in everyday
life. Respectively, there exist several definitions of risk and different ways of evaluating it. In
any application, the notion of risk is always related to the necessity of taking decisions under
uncertainty. It is impossible to achieve optimal results in any science without correct decisions,
leading to optimal consequences following from the taken decision. This is why the notion of
risk and the problem of its evaluation has, first of all, to be understood in the frame of decision
theory. It is precisely the aim of the present paper to formulate a novel approach for taking
into account the risk in decision making and to demonstrate in concrete examples, related to
temporal effects in making decisions, that this new approach is free of defects and paradoxes
plaguing the application of standard decision theory.
Classical decision theory is based on expected utility theory, which was advanced by Bernoulli
[1] and was shaped into a rigorous mathematical theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern [2].
In this theory, a decision maker chooses between several lotteries, or gambles, each being com-
posed of a set of outcomes, equipped with a probability measure. Initially [2], the probabilities
were assumed to be objective. Savage [3] extended utility theory to the case of subjective prob-
abilities. Savage’s generalization has been demonstrated to be tremendously flexible in repre-
senting the attitude of decision makers towards risk and uncertainty. Starting with Pratt [4] and
Arrow [5], different measures of risk have been proposed. Extensions and modern developments
are covered, e.g., in [6–8].
Notwithstanding a remarkable breadth of successful applications, classical decision theory,
when applied to real humans, leads to a variety of paradoxes that remain unsolved in its
framework. The first such anomaly was described by Allais [9], which is now known as the
Allais paradox. Other well known paradoxes are Ellsberg’s paradox [10], Kahneman-Tversky’s
paradox [11], the conjunction fallacy [12, 13], the disjunction effect [14], and Rabin’s paradox
[15]. These and other paradoxes are reviewed in Refs. [16, 17].
There has been many attempts to modify expected utility theory in order to get rid of
the paradoxes that plague its application to the processes involving decision making of real
human beings. One of these approaches is the cumulative-prospect theory or reference-point
theory [18], which assumes that decision making is not based on the absolute evaluation of
payoffs but depends on a reference point that is specific to the present state of the decision
maker. Because the reference point is shifted as a result of the consequences emerging from
a first decision, the subsequent decision performed, according to the reference-point theory,
is therefore sensitive to the difference between subsequent payoffs rather than to the absolute
payoff deriving solely from the second decision.
One of the main problems encountered when using reference-point theory is that the ref-
erence point of a decision maker is not uniquely defined: for a similar payoff history, each
decision maker can possess (and actually does possess) his/her own specific reference point,
which is generally unobservable. Moreover, reference-point theory is more suited to address
those anomalies that arise in gambles involving at least two-steps, in which the reference point
can be expected to be shifted after each outcome. But, the majority of paradoxes appear in
single-step gambles, where reference-point theory is not applicable. In the hope of explaining
the paradoxes mentioned above, many other variants of the so-called non-expected utility the-
ories have been suggested. A review of a variety of such non-expected utility theories can be
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found in Machina [19–21]. A rigorous analysis of these theories has been recently performed
by Safra and Segal [22], who concluded that the non-expected utility theories cannot explain
all paradoxes. Though it is possible to invent a modification of utility theory that will fit one
or a few paradoxes, the problem is that many others will remain unexplained at best, or new
inconsistencies will arise at worst.
The basic difficulty in taking into account and evaluating risk, when deciding under uncer-
tainty, is that the usual approaches assume that decision makers are rational. However, real
human beings are only partially rational [23], as is well documented by numerous empirical
data in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics [24–27]. Risk is always related to emotions.
But how could one describe emotions within a quantitative framework suitable for decision
making?
A new approach to decision making, called Quantum Decision Theory (QDT), has been ad-
vanced in Refs. [16,17,28]. The main idea of this approach is to take into account that realistic
decision-making problems are composite, consisting of several parts intimately interconnected,
intricately correlated, and entangled with each other. Several intended actions can interfere
with each other, producing effects that cannot be simply measured by ascribing a classical
utility function. The complexity involved in decision making reflects the interplay between the
decision maker’s underlying emotions and feelings and his/her attitude to risk and uncertainty
accompanying the decision making process. In order to take account of these subtle character-
istics in the most self-consistent and simple way, we suggest to use the mathematical techniques
based on the quantum theory of measurement of von Neumann [29] and developed by other
authors (see, e.g., Refs. [30,31]). This is the reason for referring to this new approach under the
name Quantum Decision Theory (QDT). It is important to stress that we do not assume that
human brains are quantum objects. It should just be understood that we use the techniques
of complex Hilbert spaces, as a convenient mathematical toolbox that provides a parsimonious
and efficient description of the complex processes involved in decision making.
In our previous papers [16, 17, 28], we formulated the mathematics of QDT and showed
that this approach provides a straightforward explanation of practically all known paradoxes of
classical decision making. However, we have not yet considered the class of so-called dynamical
inconsistencies that arise in decisions (under risks and/or uncertainty) that compare different
time horizons. The aim of the present paper is to analyze this class of inconsistency in the
frame of QDT, explaining those effects that have remained unexplained in the standard theory.
Our theory should not be confused with the approach that is called “quantum probabili-
ties from decision theory”, where one attempts to derive the rule of defining the probability
in quantum mechanics from classical decision theory. To be more precise, let us recall that
probabilities enter quantum mechanics via the Born rule, according to which the probability of
each outcome of a measurement is prescribed by the squared amplitude of the corresponding
term in the given quantum-mechanical state [32]. Deutsch [33] argued that the Born rule could
be derived from the notion of rational preferences of standard classical decision theory. This
argument was reconsidered by Wallace [34–36] who showed that the Deutsch way of reasoning,
first, necessarily requires the Everett [37] many-word interpretation of quantum mechanics and,
second, needs additional assumptions that have nothing to do with classical decision theory. A
very detailed analysis of the Deutsch-Wallace arguments has recently been given by Lewis [38],
who has persuasively demonstrated that there are several serious drawbacks in the Deutsch-
Wallace picture. First of all, the Everett many-word interpretation has its own problem related
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to its basic assumption that, after each measurement, the observer branches into a number
of successors living in different words. The number of such branches is not well defined and
even can be infinite. According to Lewis [38], “the number of branches associated with an out-
come is unknowable, undefined, and uncountable, and hence branch-counting rules are simply
unusable”. Lewis also showed that there are other gaps in the mathematics of Deutsch and
Wallace, which invalidate the proof that the Born rule could be derived form classical decision
theory [38].
In our theory, we adopt the quantum-mechanical rules as its very foundation, never trying
to derive them from some other assumptions. The mathematics we employ is in complete
agreement with the von Neumann axiomatics [29]. Using the techniques of quantum theory,
we develop the quantum decision theory that can be applied to real alive beings.
The theory of quantum measurement considers only passive quantum systems subject to
a measurement procedure imposed by an external observer. A principal difference is that
our theory describes an active decision maker. Mathematically, an active decision maker is
characterized by his/her own strategic states describing his/her main personal preferences. In
contrast, in quantum measurements performed over a passive system, there is no preferred
quantum states, and any basis can be employed.
Moreover, our approach is completely different from the theory of quantum games, suggested
by Meyer [39] (see the review articles [40, 41]). What is common for both these theories is
merely the use of the quantum theoretical techniques, but their mathematical structure is very
different. The general setup of a quantum game is as follows. One considers a passive quantum
system (gamble source), several observers (players), and an external machine (judge). The
system is prepared in a quantum state. The machine acts on this state entangling it. Each of
the players in turn acts on the resulting entangled state by a unitary transformation. In this
process, the players can exchange information between themselves and with the machine. Then
the machine again acts on the obtained state disentangling it and producing the final product
state. The payoffs are calculated according to the classical rule with additive probabilities,
hence, there is no interference in this final stage. This scheme can be considered as a variant
of quantum computation and communication. Contrary to this scheme, in our approach, we
consider only a single decision maker and not several ones. Of course, the single decision maker
can represent a group of people that act as a single person. There is no passive quantum
system, but the decision maker represents himself/herself an active system acting according
to quantum rules. The decision maker does not produce unitary transformations on the given
states. There are no external judges or machines. Since the calculations are made by quantum
rules, this involves nonadditive quantum probabilities and the related interference terms that
are of crucial importance for the analysis of what constitutes the optimal decision. Thus, the
overall structure of our theory is principally different from the setup of quantum games.
In section 2, we provide a brief summary of the architecture of QDT that is needed for
our analysis. Section 3 dissects the three classes of dynamic inconsistency (time inconsistency,
planning paradox and discounting effects) and applies QDT to them. Section 4 presents a quan-
titative formulation of the dynamics of prospects, in which hyperbolic discounting is derived
from simple principles. Section 5 concludes. Let us stress once more that the dynamic effects
have not been treated in our previous articles [16, 17, 28].
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2 Quantum decision theory
In this section, we give a brief formulation of the theory to be used. We follow the scheme of
Refs. [17,28], employing Dirac’s notation [32,42] for the states belonging to the Hilbert spaces.
To be precise, we recall below the basic definitions and axioms of QDT.
2.1 Main definitions
Definition 1. Action ring. The set of intended actions An, enumerated with an index n, forms
an action ring
A = {An : n = 1, 2, . . . , N} . (1)
The ring is equipped with the binary operations, namely the addition and multiplication: for
each Am and An belonging to A, Am + An and AmAn also belong to A. The addition is
associative, so that A1+(A2+A3) = (A1+A2)+A3, and reversible, in the sense that A1+A2 = A3
yields A1 = A3 − A2. The multiplication is distributive, A1(A2 + A3) = A1A2 + A1A3, and
idempotent, AnAn = A
2
n = An. But, generally, it is not commutative, so that AmAn does not
necessarily equal AnAm when m and n are different. There exists an empty action, such that
An0 = 0An = 0. Two actions Am and An are disjoint when AmAn = AnAm = 0.
Definition 2. Action modes. The elements of the action ring, the actions, can be composite
An =
Mn⋃
µ=1
Anµ (Mn > 1) , (2)
being composed of several representations, called modes, labelled by µ. Different modes are
assumed to be disjoint,
AnµAnν = δµνAnµ ,
where δµν is the Kronecker delta. An action is composite if Mn > 1, in the other case, it is
simple.
Definition 3. Action prospects. A more complex structure is an action prospect
pij =
⋂
n
Ajn (Ajn ∈ A) , (3)
which is a conjunction of several actions. The prospect is composite if it includes composite
actions, while it is simple if all actions in (3) are simple. Generally, the number of factors
in the intersection can be different, depending on the definition of the prospects. Since the
products of actions pertaining to the ring, by the ring structure, also pertain to the ring, then
the prospects are also members of the same ring.
Definition 4. Elementary prospects. A prospect is called elementary if all actions in its
definition (3) are simple, being represented by single modes. The elementary prospects
eα =
N⋂
n=1
Ainµn (4)
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are labelled by the binary multi-index
α = {in, µn : n = 1, 2, . . . , N}α .
The set {α} has cardinality card{α} =
∏N
n=1Mn. All elementary prospects are disjoint with
respect to each other,
eαeβ = δαβeα .
Here and in what follows, the cardinality N is the same as in Def. 1.
Definition 5. Prospect lattice. A particular family of prospects composes a prospect lattice
L = {pij : j = 1, 2, . . . , NL} , (5)
where the binary operations ≥ and ≤ are assumed to be defined, ordering the prospects so
that, for each pair pii and pij , either pii ≥ pij or pii ≤ pij . For a while, it is sufficient to keep
in mind that the prospects can be ordered. The explicit ordering procedure will be prescribed
below in Def. 16.
Definition 6. Mode states. To each mode Anµ there corresponds a complex function
|Anµ >: A → C (6)
called the mode state. The fact that each mode is idempotent and different modes are disjoint
is expressed through the orthonormality condition for the scalar product < Anµ|Anν >= δµν .
Definition 7. Mode space. The closed linear envelope
Mn = Span{|Anµ > : µ = 1, 2, . . . ,Mn} , (7)
spanning all mode states, equipped with a scalar product, is the mode space. This is a Hilbert
space of dimensionality dimMn =Mn.
Definition 8. Basic states. To each elementary prospect (4), there corresponds a complex
function
|eα > = |Ai1µ1Ai2µ2 . . . AiNµN > =
N⊗
n=1
|Ainµn > , (8)
called a basic state. Since an elementary prospect (4) is a conjunction of single modes, and
different modes are disjoint with each other, this is expressed as the orthonormality condition
for the scalar product < eα|eβ >= δαβ .
Definition 9. Mind space. The closed linear envelope
M = Span{|eα > : α ∈ {α} } =
N⊗
n=1
Mn , (9)
spanning all basic states, endowed with a scalar product, is the mind space. This is a Hilbert
space of dimensionality dimM =
∏N
n=1Mn.
Definition 10. Prospect states. To each prospect (3), there corresponds a complex function
|pij > belonging to the mind space M. Because the prospects, generally, are composite, they
are not necessarily normalized and orthogonal to each other.
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Definition 11. Strategic states. In the mind space (9), there exist fixed reference states
|ψs > ∈ M, which characterize the features typical of a given decision maker. These states
are orthonormal, such that < ψs|ψs′ >= δss′. But they do not necessarily form a basis. The
existence of the strategic states is the principal point distinguishing QDT from the usual theory
of quantum measurements.
Definition 12. Mind strategy. The collection of all strategic states |ψs >, equipped with
their weights ws, forms the mind strategy
Σ = {|ψs >,ws : s = 1, 2, . . . , S} , (10)
where
S∑
s=1
ws = 1 , 0 ≤ ws ≤ 1 . (11)
The mind strategy describes the decision-maker character, his/her main beliefs and principles,
according to which he/she makes decisions.
Definition 13. Prospect operators. Each prospect state |pij > defines the prospect operator
Pˆ (pij) = |pij >< pij| , (12)
where < pij | is the Hermitian conjugate to |pij >. The prospect operators, by definition, are
self-adjoint. The family of all prospect operators forms the involutive bijective algebra
P = {Pˆ (pij) : pij ∈ L} .
This algebra is analogous to the algebra of local observables in quantum theory.
Definition 14. Operator averages. The average of a prospect operator (12) is the sum
< Pˆ (pij) > =
S∑
s=1
ws < ψs|Pˆ (pij)|ψs > (13)
of its matrix elements over the strategic states.
Definition 15. Prospect probability. The probability of a prospect pij ∈ L is the average
p(pij) = < Pˆ (pij) > (14)
of the prospect operator (12), with the normalization condition
NL∑
j=1
p(pij) = 1 , (15)
where the summation is over the whole prospect lattice L.
Definition 16. Prospect ordering. A prospect pi1 is indifferent to a prospect pi2 if and only
if their probabilities coincide,
p(pi1) = p(pi2) (pi1 = pi2) . (16)
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And a prospect pi1 is preferred to pi2 if and only if
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (pi1 > pi2) . (17)
The ordering of prospects through the relation between their probabilities defines the explicit
ordering in the prospect lattice (5). The prospect pi∗ with the largest probability p(pi∗) =
supj p(pij) is called optimal.
Definition 17. Partial probabilities. The probability
p(pijeα) = < Pˆ (eα)Pˆ (pij)Pˆ (eα) > (18)
of a conjunction prospect pijeα defines the partial probability of realizing an elementary prospect
eα when deciding on the prospect pij. The partial probabilities are normalized as∑
j,α
p(pijeα) = 1 , (19)
where the sum is over all pij ∈ L and all eα.
Definition 18. Attraction factor. The variable
q(pij) =
∑
α6=β
< Pˆ (eα)Pˆ (pij)Pˆ (eβ) > (20)
quantifies the attractiveness of the prospect pij for a decision maker with respect to risk, un-
certainty, and biases. It arises due to the interference between the intended actions of a given
prospect pij , which occurs during the decision process.
Definition 19. Attraction ordering. The prospects are ordered with respect to their at-
tractiveness for a decision maker. A prospect pi1 is more attractive than a prospect pi2 if and
only if
q(pi1) > q(pi2) . (21)
The prospects pi1 and pi2 are equally attractive if and only if
q(pi1) = q(pi2) . (22)
The impact in decision making of emotions and feelings, which are known to be important and
practically inseparable from logical deliberation [43], are quantified by the attraction factor.
The ordering of prospects with respect to their attractiveness, quantified by the attraction
factor (20), is a principal ingredient of QDT.
Definition 20. Attraction conditions. The distinction between more or less attractive
prospects is formalized by the following rule. A prospect pi1 is more attractive than a prospect
pi2, when it is connected with:
(a) more certain gain,
(b) less certain loss,
(c) higher activity under certainty,
(d) lower activity under uncertainty.
These characteristics describe the aversion of a decision maker to risk, uncertainty, and
presumed loss.
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2.2 A few theorems
The above definitions constitute the basis of QDT [16, 17, 28]. They allow us to derive the
following theorems proved in Ref. [17], which will be needed below.
Proposition 1 (Prospect probability). The probability of a prospect pij ∈ L is
p(pij) =
∑
α
p(pijeα) + q(pij) , (23)
where the summation is over the elementary prospects eα.
Proposition 2 (Attraction alternation). The sum of all attraction factors (20) is equal to
zero:
NL∑
j=1
q(pij) = 0 , (24)
where the summation is performed over all pij ∈ L.
Proposition 3 (Preference criterion). A prospect pi1 ∈ L is preferred to a prospect pi2 ∈ L
if and only if ∑
α
[p(pi1eα)− p(pi2eα)] > q(pi2)− q(pi1) . (25)
Remark. From the form of prospect probability (23), together with condition (19) and
property (24), it is immediately seen that the normalization condition (15) is always valid.
These theorems imply that the probability of taking a given decision is controlled by the
levels of attraction of the different competing prospects, thus emphasizing the emotional compo-
nent of the decision process. Indeed, the choice of a specific prospect among several alternatives
depends not solely on its value given by the first term in the right-hand side of Eq. (23), but
also on its attractiveness quantified by the attraction factor (20). In classical decision theory,
only values measured by a utility function are considered, but emotions and feelings are not
taken into account. In QDT, the later are embodied in the new ingredients, the attraction
factors.
Two essential characteristics distinguish QDT from classical utility theory:
(i) QDT is a probabilistic theory, in which each prospect is associated with its probability,
which has a subjective component captured by the attraction factor. The prospect probability
can be measured experimentally, by interpreting it as a relative frequency, that is, it corre-
sponds to the relative ratio of decision makers accepting the given prospect. This probabilistic
framework accounts for the observations that, under the same conditions, different people en-
dowed with a priori the same preferences may make different decisions. In contrast, classical
utility theory is deterministic, with its prescription to the decision maker forcing him/her to
accept the unique alternative which corresponds to the maximal expected utility.
(ii) In addition to the payoff values, QDT takes also into account the attractiveness of the
analyzed prospects, quantified by their attraction factors (20). These attraction factors are
absent in utility theory. Therefore, a partial reduction of QDT to classical decision theory is
obtained by setting the attraction factor to zero.
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2.3 Binary mind
To make the structure of the theory clearer, it is instructive to consider the particular case of
a binary mind. This case is also of intrinsic interest because the majority of paradoxes can be
treated and explained in this specific frame.
The binary mind corresponds to considering only two actions, while each of them can possess
a number of representation modes. Let these actions be
A =
M1⋃
j=1
Aj , B =
M2⋃
µ=1
Bµ . (26)
Hence, there are two mode spaces
M1 = Span{|Aj > : j = 1, 2 . . . ,M1} , M2 = Span{|Bµ > : µ = 1, 2 . . . ,M2} . (27)
The mind space is the tensor product of these two mode spaces
M =M1 ⊗M2 , (28)
hence its name “binary”. This should not be confused with the dimensionality dimM =M1M2
of the binary mind, which can be large.
The elementary prospects (4) are ejµ = AjBµ, and the basic states (8) become
|ejµ > = |AjBµ > ≡ |Aj > ⊗ |Bµ > . (29)
The action prospects (3) can be constructed as pij = AjB, and the conjunction prospects as
pijejµ = AjBµ. According to Eq. (23), the prospect probabilities are
p(pij) =
M2∑
µ=1
p(AjBµ) + q(pij) . (30)
One can draw the following analogies between the quantities of QDT presented above, and
those of classical utility theory. The set B of modes Bµ corresponds to the set of payoffs.
Complementing this set by the related weights pj(Bµ) defines a lottery Lj. The weights pj(Bµ)
can be expressed in terms of the conditional probabilities: pj(Bµ) = p(Aj |Bµ). This defines the
probability of getting payoff Bµ in lottery Lj . The analog of the expected utility is the sum
M2∑
µ=1
p(AjBµ) =
M2∑
µ=1
p(Aj |Bµ)p(Bµ) , (31)
where p(Bµ) is a normalized measure of the payoff Bµ.
With QDT, it is possible to explain all paradoxes emerging in classical decision making
[16, 17]. To give an idea how this is done, we present here a brief account of the resolution
of Allais’ paradox [9]. Allais’ paradox can be described with a binary mind, as defined above.
For the sake of brevity, we survey only the mathematical structure of this paradox, omitting
the interpretations related to psychological features (see Refs. [16, 17] for in-depth analysis).
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A detailed description of the mathematical structure of the Allais paradox can be found in
Ref. [17].
One considers two actions as in Eq. (26), with M1 = 4 and M2 = 3 and the mind dimen-
sionality dimM = M1M2 = 12. The experiment, demonstrating Allais’ paradox, is organized
in such a way that the balance condition
p(A1Bµ) + p(A3Bµ) = p(A2Bµ) + p(A4Bµ) (32)
holds for all µ = 1, 2, 3. The goal is to compare the prospects pij = AjB for different j. Allais’
paradox is that most human decision makers prefer the prospect pi1 to pi2, and pi3 to pi4 which,
due to the balance condition (32), leads to a contradiction. The fact that pi1 is preferred to pi2
translates in the language of QDT into the inequality p(pi1) > p(pi2). The fact that prospect
pi1 looks more attractive (less uncertain, less risky) than pi2 implies that q(pi1) > q(pi2). Using
(30), this leads to
3∑
µ=1
[p(A2Bµ)− p(A1Bµ)] < q(pi1)− q(pi2) . (33)
The fact that pi3 is preferred to pi4 translates in the language of QDT into p(pi3) > p(pi4). The
larger attraction of pi3, compared with pi4, implies that q(pi3) > q(pi4). Again using (30), this
gives
3∑
µ=1
[p(A3Bµ)− p(A4Bµ)] > q(pi4)− q(pi3) . (34)
Then, using the definitions of subsection 2.1 and Proposition 2 on the property of attraction
alternation, invoking the balance condition (32), and combining inequalities (33) and (34), we
get
− |q(pi3)− q(pi4)| <
3∑
µ=1
[p(A2Bµ)− p(A1Bµ) < |q(pi1)− q(pi2)| . (35)
Classical decision theory corresponds to the limit of zero attraction factors (q(pi1) = q(pi2) =
q(pi3) = q(pi4) = 0). In this case, the two inequalities (35) result in a contradiction, since the
sum in the middle cannot be larger than zero and, at the same time, smaller than zero. Within
QDT, this contradiction does not arise. Actually, within QDT, Allais’ paradox is explained
from the interplay between the attraction factors of different prospects.
3 Dynamic inconsistency
We now use the framework of QDT to study dynamic inconsistency, which has not been treated
in our previous articles. In economics, time inconsistency refers, roughly speaking, to a situation
when the preference of a decision-maker changes over time, in such a way that what is preferred
at one point in time is inconsistent with what is preferred at another point in time. In fact,
there are numerous variants of dynamic inconsistency. By being precise, one can distinguish
three broad classes of dynamic inconsistency: (i) time inconsistency, (ii) planning paradox, and
(iii) discounting effects. We now examine each one in turn.
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3.1 Time inconsistency
Time inconsistency is well epitomized by the Strotz’s phrase [44]: “the optimal plan of the
present moment is generally one which is not obeyed, or that the individual’s future behavior
will be inconsistent with his optimal plan”. Various examples of this inconsistency have been
described in the literature [45–47]. Kydland and Prescott [46] went so far as saying that the
rational choice for future times “is not an appropriate tool for economic planning” and that
“the application of optimal control theory is equally absurd”.
The origin of time inconsistency is rather straightforward. When an individual makes a
plan for the far future, he/she cannot be conscious of all the detailed circumstances that will
arise in that future. New information is likely to appear and, in addition, the already available
information may be open for re-evaluation. Since the future situation is likely to be different,
it will require making a decision that is likely to differ from the current decision. The current
decision for the future action then turns out to be sub-optimal when the future becomes the
present.
There is no real paradox in this time inconsistency and its solution can be readily obtained:
when making a decision for the distant future, it is necessary to try to predict future changes
and include these forecasts in the decision making process. This recipe was suggested for
instance by Strotz [44] who gave, as an example, the behavior of Odysseus when his ship was
approaching the Sirens. Wishing to hear the Sirens’ songs (short-term gratification) but mindful
of the possible delayed danger (falling prey to the sirens), he ordered his men to close their ears
with beeswax and to bind him to the mast of the ship. He also ordered his men not to heed
his cries while they would pass the Sirens. In that way, Odysseus limited his future agency
and binded himself to a restriction (to the mast) to survive the long-term consequences of his
decision. Other numerous example are known, related to pension savings, health insurance,
and so on. When making plans for the far future, one tries to anticipate the obstacles that
may arise and one imposes restrictions and commitments that oppose the change of decision
that would result otherwise due to time inconsistency. With the imposed commitments, time
inconsistency disappears and the present decision becomes the optimized one for the future
state. As experiments show [48], even rats possess the ability of making decisions that take
into account an estimation of future events. We conclude that both the origin and the solution
for time inconsistency are well understood and do not require invoking additional concepts for
their interpretation.
3.2 Planning paradox
Consider a situation in which an individual makes a plan for a short future period of time,
such that no novel information will become available and the individual himself/herself does
not change over that period. In the absence of any new information and of any change, the
decision should be unchangeable as well. The invariance of the decision in that sense is referred
to as the principle of dynamic consistency in classical decision theory.
However, it often happens that the decision maker does change the plan, for not apparent
reason. A stylized example of this type of planning paradox is a smoker who plans to stop
smoking tomorrow, while enjoying the pleasure of smoking today. Making this plan, he/she
promises to stop smoking, understanding well that he/she will forgo future pleasures, for the
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anticipation of higher health benefits. The next day, while the plan and the utility resulting
from its consequences have not changed, it is often observed that the human beings change
their plan, and continue smoking.
3.2.1 Mathematical formulation of planning paradox and its resolution
Such a behavior poses a real paradox within expected utility theory. Let us formulate this
paradox in precise mathematical terms. When deciding to stop smoking in a plan, one keeps
in mind the following intended actions:
• planning to stop smoking tomorrow (A1),
• planning to continue smoking tomorrow (A2),
• wishing to have good health (B1),
• paying little attention to health (B2).
The decision to stop smoking in reality corresponds to the following intended actions:
• stop smoking in reality (A3),
• continue smoking in reality (A4),
• wishing to have good health (B1),
• paying little attention to health (B2).
The related four action sets are Xj = {AjBµ : µ = 1, 2}, with j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Following
utility theory, and ascribing probabilities to these actions, one gets the corresponding lotteries
Lj = Lj(Xj). Note that the utility functions of the actions A1B and A3B, where B = B1+B2,
are the same when expressed for tomorrow, since the two actions of stopping smoking become
equivalent. Similarly, the utility functions tomorrow of the actions A2B and A4B are equal,
since continuing smoking is the same action, with the same consequences. Therefore, the
expected utilities of the lotteries L1 and L3 are equal: U(L1) = U(L3). And analogously,
U(L2) = U(L4). But many individuals prefer L1 to L3, which implies that, for these individuals,
U(L1) > U(L3). The same individuals also choose L4 over L2, which implies that U(L2) <
U(L4). This leads to a contradiction violating the principle of dynamic consistency of classical
decision making.
Let us now show how this paradox can be explained within QDT. As above, we need to
consider the intended actions Aj, with j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and the set {Bµ}. In addition, the decision
of stopping smoking in reality is accompanied by the following intended actions:
• getting pleasure from smoking (C1),
• having no pleasure from smoking (C2),
• agreeing to suffer because of addiction (D1),
• refusing to suffer from addiction (D2).
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These additional intentions reflect emotional feelings of the decision maker, which are not taken
into account in classical utility theory.
The prospects that need now to be compared are
pi1 = A1B, pi2 = A2B
(
B =
⋃
µ
Bµ
)
(36)
and
pi3 = A3BCD, pi4 = A4BCD, (37)
where
B = B1 +B2, C = C1 + C2, D = D1 +D2.
The value of quitting smoking, either today or tomorrow, has the same determined value.
Respectively, the value of continuing smoking is also determined, being the same either today or
tomorrow. In both these cases, the utility of stopping smoking is larger than that of continuing
smoking, which can be expressed as the inequality∑
µ
p(A1Bµ) >
∑
µ
p(A2Bµ) . (38)
In QDT, the attraction factors are taken into account, which model the subjective emotions
associated with different actions. Since the health benefits are evident, stopping smoking in a
plan seems to be more attractive than to continue smoking. This looks easy, since the associated
pain is not yet felt but the risk for health, associated with the continuation of smoking, seems
evident. This is why to stop smoking in a plan is more attractive than to continue smoking.
Then the corresponding attraction factors obey the inequality q(pi1) > q(pi2). In contrast,
continuing smoking unconditionally amounts to abandon oneself to the pleasure of addiction,
which is preferred in general to the failure of not abiding to a plan to abandon smoking,
given that the health benefits are felt to be uncertain. One can summarize these emotions by
saying that continuing smoking in reality is more attractive than stopping smoking. This is
formulated mathematically by the inequality q(pi4) > q(pi3) for the corresponding attraction
factors. Summarizing, we have
q(pi1) > q(pi2) , q(pi4) > q(pi3) . (39)
Writing the prospect probabilities according to Eq. (30), and taking into account the above
discussion, shows that, in reality, the probability of continuing smoking becomes larger than
that of stopping smoking when∑
µ
[p(A1Bµ)− p(A2Bµ)] < q(pi4)− q(pi3) . (40)
Then it is implied immediately that the prospect pi1 is preferred to pi2, while pi4 is preferred
to pi3. As for other paradoxes, the absence of contradiction in QDT results from the existence
of the attraction factors, which are absent in classical utility theory. We have shown that
the attraction factors derive intrinsically from the Hilbert space structure of the theory that
accounts for interference between prospects. Putting the attraction factors to zero recovers
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the inconsistency associated with the planning paradox. As QDT is a probabilistic theory, the
above conclusion that p(pi1) > p(pi2) and p(pi4) > p(pi3) does not mean that no individual can
stop smoking. The general subjective preferences embodied in the attraction factors only tell
us that the majority of them will not be able to quit smoking.
3.2.2 Generalization to two-step games
To show that the explanation proposed by QDT is general, let us consider another example
of the planning paradox, with two-step gambles. In two-step gambles, decision makers are
typically confronted sequentially with two successive gambles, with probabilities 1/2 to gain
or to loose in each of them. Before playing the first gamble, participants are asked to make a
planned choice as whether they would take the second gamble, provided the first one is either
won or lost. Then the first gamble is played. After experiencing the actual results of the first
gamble, decision makers are asked to make a final choice regarding the second gamble, whether
they accept it or not.
A number of experiments have been performed to test the dynamic consistency in the
frame of such two-step gambles [49–51]. The experiments showed that the final choices of
the participants were frequently inconsistent with their plans, even when the anticipated and
experienced outcomes were identical. These inconsistencies are found to occur in a systematic
direction: anticipating a gain in the first gamble, decision makers planned to take the second
gamble - but after experiencing the gain, some of them changed their minds and rejected
the second gamble. And, anticipating a loss in the first gamble, the participants planned to
restrain from the second gamble - however, experiencing the actual loss, they often changed
their plans and accepted the second gamble. Attempts were made [49, 51] to explain this
inconsistency within the framework of the reference-point theory [18], arguing that, after the
first gamble, the reference point of the decision makers has been shifted. In the introduction
Section 1, we have already discussed the weakness of the reference-point approach. These are
the ambiguity in defining both the reference point as well as the shift. And, what is more
important, the reference-point theory can be applied only to two-step or multi-step gambles.
It is not applicable to single-step gambles. But there are numerous cases where the planning
paradox occurs in single-step gambles, such as in the above example of the smokers planning to
stop smoking. In an earlier publication [52], the authors mentioned that the planning paradox
in two-step gambles could be related to quantum effects. Below, we provide a concrete proof
in the frame of QDT, by showing how the planning paradox in two-step games finds a natural
resolution.
The mathematical structure of the two-step gambles of the type described in Refs. [49–51]
can be reduced to a structure that is similar to, though slightly more complicated than, the
structure underlying the case described in the previous subsection 3.2.1. The two-step game
proceeds as follows. The first gamble is obligatory and cannot be refused while the second
gamble can be rejected. Specifically, the following alternatives are offered to the decision
maker.
• Assuming an anticipated gain (C1) or loss (C2) in the first gamble, the second gamble
can be accepted (A1) or rejected (A2), with the chances of winning (B1) or loosing (B2)
being equal.
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• After experiencing a realized gain (C3) or an actual loss (C4) in the first gamble, the
second gamble can be accepted (A1) or rejected (A2), with the chances of winning (B1)
or to loose (B2).
The planning stage, before playing the first game, is characterized by the four prospects
pi1 = A1BC1 , pi2 = A2BC1 , pi3 = A1BC2 , pi4 = A2BC2 , (41)
where B = B1 +B2. After having played the first game, the decision maker faces the four new
prospects
pi5 = A1BC3 , pi6 = A2BC3 , pi7 = A1BC4 , pi8 = A2BC4 . (42)
The four prospects in the planning stage form two binary lattices:
L1 = {pi1, pi2} , L2 = {pi3, pi4} . (43)
The four prospects available after playing the first game form the two other binary lattices
L3 = {pi5, pi6} , L4 = {pi7, pi8} . (44)
Analogously to conditions in subsec. 3.2.1, it is assumed that the utility of accepting or
rejecting the second gamble does not depend on whether the first gamble is assumed to be won
or lost in the planning stage or actually won or lost in reality. This means that∑
µ
p(A1BµC1) =
∑
µ
p(A1BµC3) ,
∑
µ
p(A1BµC2) =
∑
µ
p(A1BµC4) . (45)
Next, we model the subjective beliefs and emotions commonly observed in humans by specifying
the attraction factors of each prospect. Many human beings share the gambler’s fallacy [53],
in which an observed deviation from an expected fair chance of winning or losing is expected
to be followed by a reversal. In other words, playing a gamble with equal chances to win or to
loose, humans often expect that, after winning one gamble, the chance to win a second gamble
is reduced. Reciprocally, after loosing one gamble, the odds to win the next gamble are felt to
increase. One can say that, after winning a gamble, a fear to loose the next gamble appears.
However, this fear is less intense in imagination than in reality. That is, the perceived risk in
the planning stage is weaker than after the realized gain of the first game, since an imaginary
gain or loss is less certain than the real one. This makes the prospect pi1 of accepting the second
gamble, after an anticipated gain in the first gamble, more attractive than the prospect pi5 of
really accepting the second gamble after an actual gain in the first gamble. This translates into
q(pi1) > q(pi5) . (46)
Similarly, after loosing in the first gamble, the expectation to win in the second gamble increases,
but less in imagination than following a realized win, hence
q(pi3) < q(pi7) . (47)
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We thus obtain the probabilities of the prospects pi1 and pi5 as
p(pi1) = p(A1B1C1) + p(A1B2C1) + q(pi1) , p(pi5) = p(A1B1C3) + p(A1B2C3) + q(pi5) . (48)
Similarly, the probabilities of the prospects pi3 and pi7 are
p(pi3) = p(A1B1C2) + p(A1B2C2) + q(pi3) , p(pi7) = p(A1B1C4) + p(A1B2C4) + q(pi7) . (49)
Comparing these probabilities, with taking account of conditions (45), we get
p(pi1)− p(pi5) = q(pi1)− q(pi5) , p(pi7)− p(pi3) = q(pi7)− q(pi3) . (50)
From Eq. (46), we obtain p(pi1) > p(pi5), that is, the first prospect is preferred to the fifth
prospect, pi1 > pi5: individuals choose to play the second game more often when they do not
know the outcome of the first game but expect a gain, than after the gain is realized. From
Eq. (47), we see that p(pi7) > p(pi3), hence the seventh prospect is preferred to the third one,
pi7 > pi3: individuals choose more often to play the second game after losing the first game
than when imagining that they could lose before playing the first game. Thus, no contradiction
arises within QDT.
We again emphasize that the preference for one prospect at the expense of a second prospect
does not imply that all decision makers choose it, but only that the fraction of decision makers
preferring that prospect is larger than the fraction of decision makers choosing the second
prospect. Depending on the gain prizes and on the loss amounts, the resulting differences
between the corresponding prospect probabilities may be small. For example, in the experiment
of Barkan and Busemeyer [51] on the planning paradox, the probabilities, measured as the
average fractions of decision makers taking the corresponding alternatives are as follows. In the
planning stage before playing the first game, one has
p(pi1) = 0.60 , p(pi2) = 0.40 , p(pi3) = 0.63 , p(pi4) = 0.37 . (51)
After the gain or loss of playing the first game are known, the probabilities of the different
prospects are
p(pi5) = 0.53 , p(pi6) = 0.47 , p(pi7) = 0.69 , p(pi8) = 0.31 . (52)
This gives
p(pi1)− p(pi5) = 0.07 , p(pi7)− p(pi3) = 0.06 . (53)
Thus, while the planning paradox is clear, not all individuals follow it, justifying the probabilis-
tic framework of QDT. Moreover, as is seen from the above equations, the difference between
the compared prospect probabilities is rather small, lying on the boundary of statistical errors.
Concluding this section, the planning paradox has been explained away by taking into
account the impact of subjective beliefs and emotions in decision making via the attraction
factor defined by expression (20). We stress also that the proposed framework remains valid
both for single-step as well as for multistep gambles.
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3.3 Discounting effects
Generally, the term discounting addresses the problem of translating values from one time
period to another. The larger the discount rate, the more weight the decision maker places on
costs and benefits in the near term over costs and benefits over the long term. Depending on
the specification of the problem, it is possible to distinguish several discounting effects, that we
analyze in turn.
3.3.1 Value discounting
According to classical utility theory, the costs and benefits of an action can be evaluated by
means of its utility, or its value to the decision maker. The benefits of an action are, for instance,
to receive an amount of money or any other useful object at a given time. When an action x
is made at time t, it has a utility u(x, t). Assume, we start our analysis at time zero, t = 0,
when the action utility is u(x, 0). But the same action at a later time t is u(x, t), which may
be different. The difference comes from the obvious understanding that what we get earlier we
can start using earlier, hence, it is more useful than what we would get later, having less time
for its use. A typical example is provided by the time value of money. An amount x of money
received at time t = 0 has a value u(x, 0). This money can bring a profit, increasing, after the
period of time tn to the amount x(1 + r)
tn , where r is an interest rate for a unit time interval.
Therefore, the value of money x today is larger than the value of the same amount of money
after time tn. Hence, it is natural to prefer x now, instead of x at a future time tn.
In QDT, this preference for a receipt now rather than delayed can be framed in the following
decision making procedure. We consider the intended actions of getting an amount of money
now (A1) or, the same amount, sometimes later (A2). The different possible ways of using this
money are described by a set {Bµ} of intended actions Bµ. One makes a choice between the
prospects
pij = AjB , B ≡
⋃
µ
Bµ (j = 1, 2) . (54)
The prospect probabilities are
p(pi1) =
∑
µ
p(A1Bµ) + q(pi1) , p(pi2) =
∑
µ
p(A2Bµ) + q(pi2) . (55)
The fact that an amount of money now gives more possibilities than the same amount received
later means that ∑
µ
p(A1Bµ) >
∑
µ
p(A2Bµ) . (56)
In addition, getting something later is more uncertain, hence, q(pi1) > q(pi2). Then it is evident
that pi1 > pi2.
While the conclusion is the same as in classical utility theory, what QDT brings additionally
is the breakdown of the time value into an objective component (the sums of probabilities in
(56) quantifying the investment and consumption opportunities) and a subjective component
q(pi) quantifying the emotional cost of various degrees of delaying.
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3.3.2 Event uncertainty
Certain paradoxes arise because the problems are not well-posed or are too ill-defined with some
features remaining unspecified or vague. Consider the typical example where one has to choose
between 50 dollars now or a significantly larger amount, say 100 dollars, in a year. Proposing
a larger amount in the future is supposed to account for the discounting effect of the previous
subsection. Indeed, given that a given amount now is always preferred to the same amount in
the future (assuming a normal growing economy), as explained in the previous subsection, one
can expect to find some larger amount tomorrow that would be as attractive as the proposed
sum today. The ratio of the two sums defines the discount factor of a given individual, which
quantifies the value of his/her time preference. The example comparing $50 now to $100 in a
year implicitly considers that the rational discount factor cannot be less than 1/2, or in other
words, the interest rate that would provide dividends to an investment of $50 cannot be larger
than 100%, so that the sum of $100 in a year should be more attractive than the sum of $50
received immediately. It turns out that it is often observed that individuals prefer to get $50
now instead of $100 in a year. This seems a priori quite puzzling.
In fact, there is no real mystery, even within classical utility theory: because of the formu-
lation of the problem, the related probabilities are not defined. And decision makers intuitively
understand that the receipt of $50 now is rather certain, while the sum of $100 in a year is not
certain at all. That is, one compares the lottery L1 = {0, 0; $50, 1; $100, 0} with the lottery
L2 = {0, 1− p; $50, 0; $100, p}, where p is not known. It can be perceived to be small because
of many reasons, e.g., lack of trust in the commitment to deliver $100 in a year due to uncer-
tainties associated with the possible death, bankruptcy or simply default of the counter party,
or uncertainty in the survival of the decision maker who would not be in a position to enjoy the
receipt of $100 in a year. Therefore, the expected utility of the first lottery is U(L1) = u($50),
while that of the second lottery is U(L2) = (1−p)u(0)+pu($100). For sufficiently small p≪ 1,
it happens that U(L1) > U(L2), justifying the preference of L1 to L2. The effect is referred to
in the literature as “uncertainty aversion”.
In QDT, this effect is easily described in the same way as in subsection 3.3.1. One compares
the prospects of getting $50 now (pi1) or $100 in a year (pi2). The smaller probability of the
second prospect implies inequality (56). The process of waiting is related to anxiety [54], making
the delayed event of getting money less attractive. And, by definition, the second prospect is
less attractive since it is more uncertain. That is, q(pi1) > q(pi2). The immediate result is that
pi1 > pi2.
It is interesting to compare the two explanations. In classical utility theory, the preference
for $50 now instead of $100 in a year is accounted for by uncertainty aversion, translating into
a small subjective probability for the $100 payoff to happen. In QDT, the uncertainty aversion
is embodied automatically into the attraction factor q(pi), while the normal discounting effects
associated with different opportunities are included in the objective probabilities
∑
µ p(AjBµ).
3.3.3 Preference reversal
A standard problem in classical decision theory is revealed by a dynamic-inconsistency para-
dox associated with the inversion of preferences, in which money versus time preferences are
inverted as the time horizon is changed. To specify the problem, let us consider the follow-
ing setup. There is a choice between $50 now and $100 in a year. As discussed in Sec. 3.3.2
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above, individuals almost always prefer $50 now. But when there is a choice between $50 in
ten years and $100 in eleven years, human beings usually prefer $100 in eleven years. This
reversal of preference occurs notwithstanding the fact that the time difference between ten and
eleven years is exactly the same as between zero and one, so that a pure rational discounting
mechanism would predict the same consistent choice of the smaller amount at the earlier time.
This reversal is usually associated with a trait characterizing human beings, called hyperbolic
value discounting or generalized hyperbolic discounting [55–60], such that the near events are
characterized by larger discount rates than the events in a more distant future. The problem is
that this explanation unavoidably leads to time inconsistency since, when the decision maker
reconsiders the same choice after ten years, he/she again would prefer $50 today to $100 in a
year, thus again reversing the previous preference he/she expressed ten years earlier.
The preference-reversal paradox finds a natural explanation within QDT, since its formula-
tion in terms of prospects implies that choices considered at different times and planned for at
different future instants of time are actually different prospects, even though they are associ-
ated with equivalent actions. To be more precise, a correct definition of a prospect pij depends
on the point in time t0 when it is considered, as well as on the point in time t for which it is
planned to be realized. That is, strictly speaking, a prospect is a function pij(t, t0). With this
specification, the above setup can be formalized as follows. Let the prospects of getting $50
or $100 correspond to the notations pi1 and pi2, respectively. At time t0 = 0, there are four
prospects. One is the prospect pi1(0, 0) of getting $50 now. Another is the prospect pi2(1, 0)
of getting $100 in a year. The third prospect is pi1(10, 0) of getting $50 in 10 years. And the
fourth prospect pi2(11, 0) is getting $100 in 11 years. As discussed above, the odds of getting
$50 now are more certain than those of getting $100 in a year, hence
pi1(0, 0) > pi2(1, 0) . (57)
At the same time, both prospects of getting $50 in ten years or $100 in eleven years seem
almost equally uncertain. However, the stake in the latter case is larger, which results in the
preference
pi2(11, 0) > pi1(10, 0) . (58)
After time elapses to the decision at the point in time t0 = 10, two new prospects become
available. One is the prospect pi1(10, 10) of getting $50 at this moment of time and another,
pi2(11, 10) of getting $100 one year later after t0 = 10. Using the same arguments, one has
pi1(10, 10) > pi2(11, 10) . (59)
There is no contradiction between the above decisions, since different prospects are compared.
4 Prospect dynamics
4.1 Definition of the discount factor
The evolution of probabilities in classical decision theory are usually characterized by Markov
equations [52, 61]. To determine how the probability of a given prospect in QDT evolves as
a function of time, let us consider a prospect pij(t, t0) of deciding at time t0 for the planned
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realization at a later time t. The corresponding prospect state is |pij(t, t0) >. Using the
definitions of section 2.1, the corresponding prospect operator is
Pˆ (pij(t, t0)) = |pij(t, t0) >< pij(t, t0)| . (60)
The prospect probability is defined by the average (13), which we denote
pj(t, t0) ≡ < Pˆ (pij(t, t0)) > . (61)
We may assume that the mind strategy defined by Eq. (10), which characterizes a given
decision maker, does not change during the time during which the decisions are made. In other
words, the same decision maker is considered. Then, the prospect probability varies in time as
d
dt
pj(t, t0) = <
d
dt
Pˆ (pij(t, t0)) > . (62)
Let us define the decay rate αj(t, t0) of the prospect state |pij(t, t0) > through the equation
d
dt
|pij(t, t0) >= − αj(t, t0) |pij(t, t0) > . (63)
The decay rate αj(t, t0) accounts for the possible disappearance of opportunities as the future
unfolds. The above equation is the definition of the decay rate. Since the latter depends on
time, this definition does not necessarily imply that the time evolution of the prospect state is
exponential. And the following consideration will show that, really, there can occur different
types of the time evolution.
Accomplishing the differentiation in the right-hand side of Eq. (62) yields
d
dt
pj(t, t0) = −γj(t, t0)pj(t, t0) , (64)
where
γj(t, t0) ≡ 2Re[αj(t, t0)] (65)
can be called the “probability discount rate.” Integrating equation (64) gives the prospect
probability
pj(t, t0) = pj(t0, t0)fj(t, t0) , (66)
with the discount factor
fj(t, t0) ≡ exp
{
−
∫ t
t0
γj(t
′, t0) dt
′
}
, (67)
obeying the initial value condition fj(t0, t0) = 1. Equations (66) and (67) define the probability
of a prospect, evaluated at an initial time t0, which is to be realized at the instant of time t.
In the economic literature, the simplest and standard assumption is to assume a constant
discount rate, corresponding to an exponential discount factor. As reviewed by Cochrane [62],
the exponential discount factor can be generalized into the concept of the stochastic discount
factor which, by capturing the macro-economic risks underlying each security’s value, provides
a consistent pricing of all assets. Different models, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
multifactor models, term structure of bond yields, and option pricing can be derived as different
specifications of the discount factor.
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4.2 First-principle construction of discount rate
Here in contrast, rather than deriving the form of the discount factor that corresponds to a
specific economic model, we construct, by using general symmetry requirements, the possible
generic functional dependencies that the discount factor can take to describe the value of delayed
payoffs. For this, we use the self-similar approximation theory [63–69]. The idea is to start
from an expansion of the discount rate valid for short time, that is believed to be generally
valid. Then, particular conditions are implemented to construct the functional forms that
can be naturally associated with the initial expansion. The derivation of the corresponding
discount factor proceeds through three successive steps. First, to improve the convergence
property of a perturbative sequence, control functions, defined by an optimization procedure,
are introduced. This idea forms the foundation of the optimized perturbation theory [68, 69].
The second pivotal idea is to consider the successive passage from one approximation to the
next one as a dynamical evolution on the manifold of approximants, which is formalized by
the notion of group self-similarity. The third principal point is the introduction of control
functions in the course of rearranging perturbative asymptotic expansions by means of algebraic
transforms. We use the variant of the self-similar approximation theory [63–69] employing the
self-similar factor approximants [70–74], based on the property that the control parameters
entering the self-similar factors can be completely defined from a given asymptotic expansion
by the so-called accuracy-through-order matching method. This approach was shown to be
essentially more accurate than the method of Pade´ approximants [75]. Moreover, the latter
method, as is well known, does not allow a unique reconstruction of the sought function, but
results in a whole table of approximants for each given approximation order. Contrary to
this, the factor approximants are uniquely defined. In addition to providing reconstruction
with a very good accuracy of rational functions, as the Pade´ method does, the method of
factor approximants determines irrational and transcendental functions with excellent precision
[70–74]. These approximants also allow one to reconstruct a wide class of functions exactly.
In its applications to the construction of the functional dependence of the discount factor, we
proceed as follows. First, we note that, in full generality, the probability discount rate γj(t, t0)
can be positive as well as negative. This is because the prospect probabilities are normalized
according to condition (15). Consequently, if there are diminishing probabilities, then there
should exist increasing probabilities in order that normalization (15) be always valid. For
instance, if the probability of getting something attractive, like money, diminishes with time,
then the probability of getting nothing, respectively, increases. Therefore, in what follows, it
is sufficient to consider only decreasing probabilities, related to getting something appealing,
keeping in mind that there exist as well their increasing counterparts defined through the
normalization (15). The condition, that the probability discount rate γj(t, t0) is a nonincreasing
function of time, reads
d
dt
γj(t, t0) ≤ 0 . (68)
To go further, we assume that the rate γj(t, t0) is an analytic function of t in the vicinity of
the initial time t = t0. This means that the expansion
γj(t, t0) ≃ γj
k∑
n=0
an(t− t0)
n , (69)
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where γj ≡ γj(t0, t0) is the spot rate and a0 = 1, is valid for asymptotically small t − t0 → 0.
The upper limit k of the summation can be taken to infinity.
Then, the method of self-similar factor approximants [70–74] mentioned above is used to
construct the general class of functions corresponding to the expansion (69). This amounts
to extrapolate the asymptotic series (69), valid for small t − t0, to the region of all t > t0.
Extrapolating, by means of the self-similar factor approximants [70–74], the asymptotic series
(69) under condition (68) gives
γj(t, t0) = γj
(
1 +
t− t0
tj
)−nj
, (70)
where tj is a time scale and nj ≥ 0. We stress the non-trivial nature of the construction of
the function (70) by the self-similar factor approximants, which makes appear the exponent nj .
This exponent plays a key role in structuring the form of the discount factor.
4.3 Four classes of discount factors
Four types of discount factors are predicted, corresponding to the four different sets: (i) nj = 0;
(ii) 0 < nj < 1; (iii) nj = 1; and (iv) 1 < nj.
(i) nj = 0. The discounting function (67) is the simple exponential
fj(t, t0) = exp{−γj(t− t0)} . (71)
This type of discount factor is standard in the value-discounting problems. We may notice that
reparametrizing Eq. (71) with the substitution δ ≡ exp(−γj) yields an equivalent expression
fj(t, t0) = δ
t−t0
j .
(ii) 0 < nj < 1. The discounting function (67) takes the form
fj(t, t0) = exp
{
−
γjtj
1− nj
[(
1 +
t− t0
tj
)1−nj
− 1
]}
. (72)
At short times t−t0 < tj , the expression fj(t, t0) reduces approximately to the pure exponential
form. However, for large times, such that t≫ t0, tj , this fj(t, t0) is approximated by the function
fj(t, t0) ≃ exp
{
−
γjtj
1− nj
(
t
tj
)1−nj}
, (73)
called the stretched exponential (see, e.g., Chapter 6 of Ref. [76]). Stretched exponential
relaxation of a macroscopic variable to an equilibrium is well-known in physics, such as in
“complex” fluids [77], glasses [78–82], porous media, semiconductors, etc., a law known under
the name Kohlrausch–Williams–Watts law [78, 81]. The stretched-exponential decay of the
discount factor as a function of time reflects a decay slower than exponential of the time value
of future payoffs. An even slower decay is found for the next case.
(iii) nj = 1. The discounting function (67) reads
fj(t, t0) =
1
[1 + (t− t0)/tj]γjtj
. (74)
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This recovers the postulated form associated with so-called generalized hyperbolic discounting
or, simply, hyperbolic discounting function [55–59], which seems to account better for the
observed time-preference of human beings than the standard exponential form (71).
(iv) nj > 1. Eq. (67) leads to
fj(t, t0) = exp
{
−
γjtj
nj − 1
[
1 −
1
(1 + (t− t0)/tj)nj−1
]}
. (75)
At short times, fj(t, t0) is again well-approximated by an exponential form. However, at large
times, when t− t0 ≫ tj , the factor fj(t, t0) tends to a non-zero limit
lim
t→∞
fj(t, t0) = exp
(
−
γjtj
nj − 1
)
. (76)
This is in contrast with the previous cases (71) to (74) and with the standard assumption that
fj(t, t0) tends to zero at large times because individuals do not care for events that are very-very
far in the future. This new regime is a priori unexpected and surprising, because it implies that
payoffs or costs that are very far in the future still contribute a finite amount to the likelihood
of a given prospect. In common terms, according to (75) leading to (76), extremely far ahead
outcomes are not discounted to zero, but provide a finite input to the effective utility of the
decision maker. While providing perhaps the most dramatic rupture with standard discounting
and decision making theory, we believe that the form (75) leading to the bizarre result (76)
is actually formalizing an important element of decision making. Specifically, very low to
zero discount rates are presently being discussed for analyzing intergenerational public policy
choices [83–85]. These policies encompass issues such as global warming and nuclear waste
disposal. Nuclear waste disposal, in particular, involves time scales up to millions of years over
which mankind will have to continue to monitor and watch the long-lived radionuclides resulting
from the burning of nuclear fuel in nuclear plants. The ongoing challenge is to characterize
distant future costs or benefits in a way that is relevant for policy makers, who must evaluate
trade-offs today.
4.4 Prospect-dependent discount rates
In full generality, different intended actions can be characterized by different discount functions.
Even if, for simplicity, the same discount function is employed, then different actions can have
different decay rates γj or different time scales tj. This can lead to a reversal of natural
preferences.
For example, let a prospect pi1 be preferred to pi2, if they are realized at the initial time t0,
so that for their probabilities the following inequality holds:
p1(t0, t0)
p2(t0, t0)
> 1 . (77)
But, if these prospects are planned to be realized at a later time t, then their probabilities form
the ratio
p1(t, t0)
p2(t, t0)
=
p1(t0, t0)f1(t, t0)
p2(t0, t0)f2(t, t0)
. (78)
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It may happen that at some moment of time trev, their probabilities reverse, so that for t > trev,
p1(t, t0)
p2(t, t0)
< 1 (t > trev) , (79)
which implies preference reversal. This phenomenon, known as “time inconsistency” in the
literature, is usually associated with non-exponential discount factors. It may also occur with
exponential discount factors, when the discount rate is different from the risk-adjusted return
on saving (see, e.g., Chapter 15 in Ref. [6]). Within QDT, time reversal can also occur for the
exponential discount factor when the discount rates of two prospects are different. The reversal
time in the case of the exponential discounting (71) is
trev = t0 +
1
γ1 − γ2
ln
p1(t0, t0)
p2(t0, t0)
, (80)
which exists for γ1 > γ2. In the case of the hyperbolic discounting (74), with γjtj = 1, the
reversal time reads as
trev = t0 +
p1(t0, t0)− p2(t0, t0)
γ1p2(t0, t0)− γ2p1(t0, t0)
, (81)
which exists under the condition
γ1
γ2
>
p1(t0, t0)
p2(t0, t0)
. (82)
Recall that the initial time t0 corresponds to the planning time when the decision maker eval-
uates a prospect that is assumed to be realized at the point in time t ≥ t0. Thus, the planning
time t0 is also a variable, which shifts when the decision-maker re-evaluates his/her plans. As
a consequence, there is no preference-reversal paradox within QDT, as explained in Sec. 3.3.3.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a novel approach to decision making, based on the mathematical techniques
of complex Hilbert spaces over a lattice of composite prospects. Such techniques are typical
for the theory of quantum measurements, which explains the name “Quantum Decision The-
ory” (QDT). We stress that this does not presuppose that decision makers are assumed to be
quantum objects. The employed mathematical methods are just the most convenient tool for
taking into account such notions as risk and uncertainty which have strong emotional effects
in decision making. QDT makes it possible to explain the paradoxes appearing in the applica-
tion of classical utility theory to decision making. In the present paper, we have analyzed the
stylized effects and paradoxes, associated with dynamic aspects of decision theory, such as time
inconsistency, planning paradox, value discounting, event uncertainty, and preference reversal.
These temporal effects have not been considered in our previous articles on QDT [16, 17, 28]
and the treatment offered here is original. We have also suggested a constructive approach for
deriving the evolution equations for the prospect probabilities. The derived discount functions
provide a novel classification of possible discount factors, which include the previously known
cases (exponential or hyperbolic discounting), but also predicts a novel class of discount factors
that can be applied for very long-term discounting situations.
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One of the basic conclusions of QDT is the necessity of taking into account not merely
the utility of the considered prospects, as in classical utility theory, but also the attractiveness
of the related alternatives. This is accounted for by the attraction factor, whose appearance
is due to the use of the quantum techniques. The attraction factor characterizes the level of
attractiveness of each prospect with regard to the risk and uncertainty associated with the
choice among the related alternatives. In that way, the attraction factor is a new measure of
risk in decision making. Mathematically, its appearance is caused by the use of quantum rules
in defining the prospect probabilities. And its meaning is the characterization of the perceived
level of risk associated with emotions and subconscious processes that influence decision making.
In brief, we can say that the physics of risk in decision making, described by the attraction
factor, embodies the existence of subconscious feelings, emotions, and biases.
The notion of risk is met in many applications, such as economics, finance, psychology, and
so on. In all these applications, it is always connected with the process of taking decisions.
Therefore, to elucidate the physics of risk, one needs, first of all, to understand its meaning in
decision making. Without such an understanding, it is impossible to properly employ this notion
in applications to other fields. As we have shown, the evaluation of risk presents two sides.
In addition to a first contribution, measured, e.g., through the risk-aversion coefficients [4, 5]
and the lottery dispersion, it is necessary to take into account its subjective part caused by
emotions. A principal result of our theory is that, despite the subjectivity of the emotional
side of risk, it is possible to naturally take it into account in a logical and mathematically
self-consistent way. Our QDT is the first mathematically rigorous realization of the old Bohr
idea [86] that mental human processes can be described by techniques of quantum theory.
Obviously, taking correct decisions is of paramount importance. This is why the devel-
oped theory can find numerous applications. Several illustrations have been analyzed in the
present paper. We have concentrated our attention here on temporal effects, related to time
inconsistency, which have not been considered in our previous articles.
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